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I. INTRODUCTION 
“We are on the cusp of changing the legal relationship between 
nonhuman animals and humans. The time is now to push even harder, 
as hard as we can. And keep pushing until we win.”1 
Public concern for animals has dramatically increased in recent 
years, particularly in the United States and other Western nations. 
There has been a rise in the uptake of vegan diets2 and animal advocacy 
in general. At the same time, human cruelty toward animals has 
escalated. A burgeoning global population has led to increased food 
requirements,3 while growing wealth in many countries has increased the 
demand for animal food products.4 Animals used for food are subject 
to cruel treatment daily.5 While the public interest in animal welfare is 
yet to be fully embraced by the law, it does suggest that a significant 
proportion of the public wishes to see an increase in the legal 
protections granted to animals.  
In terms of how to better protect animals, direction can be taken 
from the animal advocacy movement (AAM). Following the publication 
of Peter Singer’s seminal text Animal Liberation in 1975, the AAM 
developed and flourished. Yet, there are significant differences in the 
ideologies6 and types of activism that are accepted and practiced by the 
wide range of individuals and organizations that make up the AAM. 
Their views on human and animal relations are markedly divergent, as 
are their views about the best methods to achieve their goals. However, 
                                                                    
1
 NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, https://www.nonhumanrights.org 
[https://perma.cc/Z9X9-PANH]. 
2
 Lindsay Oberst, Why the Global Rise in Vegan and Plant-Based Eating Isn’t A Fad 
(600% Increase in U.S. Vegans + Other Astounding Stats), FOOD REVOLUTION 
NETWORK (Jan. 18, 2018), https://foodrevolution.org/blog/vegan-statistics-global/ 
[https://perma.cc/JZ2V-8UHB]. 
3
 Maarten Elferink & Florian Schierhorn, Global Demand for Food Is Rising. Can We 
Meet It? HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 7, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/04/global-demand-for-
food-is-rising-can-we-meet-it [https://perma.cc/8QT6-N9BB]. 
4
 Availability and Changes in Consumption of Animal Products, WORLD HEALTH 
ORG., https://www.who.int/nutrition/topics/3_foodconsumption/en/index4.html 
[https://perma.cc/CBS9-2QS8]. 
5
 Rachel Hosie, The Undercover Investigators Exposing Animal Abuse in Factory 
Farms, INDEPENDENT (Jan. 4, 2017), https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/animal-
abuse-factory-farms-undercover-investigators-pigs-chickens-cows-turkeys-mercy-for-
animals-a7501816.html [https://perma.cc/8SE8-DTQD]. 
6
 See David Snow & Robert Benford, Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant 
Mobilization, in FROM STRUCTURE TO ACTION: COMPARING SOCIAL MOVEMENT 
RESEARCH ACROSS CULTURES, 197–217 (Bert Klandermans et al. eds., 1988); David 
Snow, Framing Processes, Ideology, and Discursive Fields, in THE BLACKWELL 
COMPANION TO SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, 380−412 (David Snow et al. eds., 2004); Pamela 
Oliver & Hank Johnston, What a Good Idea! Frames and Ideologies in Social 
Movement Research, 5 MOBILIZATION: AN INT’L Q. 37, 37 (2000).  
2
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there is still enough commonality amongst the various participants and 
ideologies to identify one broad movement.  
The chief ideological divide is between animal welfare and animal 
rights.7 Put simply, animal welfare allows humans to continue using and 
killing animals while ensuring some protection for animals.8 Animal 
welfare is associated with “humane” animal products, such as free-range 
eggs and organic milk. Animal rights theory provides a more 
fundamental challenge to our current relationship with animals. The 
ideology of animal rights contests the concept of animals existing for 
humans to use and slaughter, regardless of how “humanely” or 
otherwise this is done. It holds that humans should confer fundamental 
rights to animals. Animal rights are closely tied to veganism, which 
involves an individual commitment not to eat or otherwise consume 
animal products as well as to avoid other instances of animal 
exploitation, such as the use of animals for entertainment.9 Broadly, 
animal activist ideologies often sit somewhere on the spectrum between 
these two positions. 
The animal welfare paradigm remains the dominant legal 
approach to animal protection in most countries.10 In this respect, 
numerous countries have enacted animal welfare legislation, which 
seeks to regulate the ways in which humans interact with animals such 
that animal suffering is reduced.11 For example, in the United States, the 
Animal Welfare Act provides minimum acceptable standards for the 
care and treatment of particular kinds of animals.12 The Act came into 
operation in 1966 and is the primary piece of federal legislation in the 
United States that regulates the ways humans treat animals.13 Similarly, 
                                                                    
7
 Robert Garner, Animal Welfare: A Political Defense, 1 J. ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 161, 
161 (2006); Tania Signal & Nicola Taylor, Attitudes to Animals in the Animal 
Protection Community Compared to a Normative Community Sample, 14 SOC’Y & 
ANIMALS 265, 266 (2006) [hereinafter Attitudes to Animals]; Nicola Taylor & Tania 
Signal, Willingness to Pay: Australian Consumers and “On the Farm” Welfare, 12 J. 
APPLIED ANIMAL WELFARE SCI. 345, 346 (2009) [hereinafter Willingness to Pay]. 
8
 AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS’N, ANIMAL WELFARE: WHAT IS IT?, 
https://www.avma.org/KB/Resources/Reference/AnimalWelfare/Pages/what-is-animal-
welfare.aspx [https://perma.cc/42J6-9VE5]. 
9
 Cary Williams, The Framing of Animal Cruelty by Animal Advocacy Organizations 
13−14 (2012) (unpublished Honors thesis, The Honors College, University of Maine). 
10
 Tara Ward, Suffering Under the Law: Could Human Rights Be Used to Protect the 
Basic Interests of All Animals?, 1 AUSTL. ANIMAL PROTECTION L.J. 57, 57 (2008). 
11
 Id. at 57–58. 
12
 Animal Welfare Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89–544, 80 Stat. 350 [hereinafter Animal 
Welfare Act of 1966].  
13
 U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., NAT’L AGRIC. LIBRARY, Animal Welfare Act, 
https://www.nal.usda.gov/awic/animal-welfare-act [https://perma.cc/LEU8-NN8N]. 
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Australia and New Zealand have animal welfare laws that cover a wide 
range of animals used for different purposes.14  
In recent times, however, animal rights language has emerged in 
some jurisdictions. In December 2013, the Nonhuman Rights Project 
lodged its first lawsuits on behalf of four chimpanzees held in captivity 
in New York State, seeking recognition of the chimpanzees’ rights to 
bodily liberty.15 While this case was ultimately unsuccessful, it did inspire 
reflection by New York Court of Appeals Judge, Eugene M. Fahey, that 
“the issue [of] whether a nonhuman animal has a fundamental right to 
liberty protected by the writ of habeas corpus is profound and far-
reaching” and will need to be addressed.16 In India, the High Court in 
Uttarakhand has recognized animals as rights holders.17 Some countries, 
including Bolivia and Ecuador, have introduced protections for animals 
using the language of animal rights in their constitutions.18 
This article contends that the case has been persuasively made for 
the attribution of rights to animals. Rights have the potential to lead to 
significant gains for animals, whereas any advances within the welfare 
framework will always be extremely limited. Yet, for some people, the 
concept of rights for animals seems absurd. Accordingly, this article 
argues that the focus of academic discussion should be on what rights 
animals are entitled to, rather than whether animals require welfare 
protections or rights. While there has been some academic commentary 
on what rights might be attributed to animals,19 developing a coherent 
and comprehensive framework for the attribution of rights will 
demystify what constitutes a rights-based approach to animals. This 
framework could also potentially remove some of the fear associated 
with granting rights to the “other.” 
This article will begin with an overview of the contemporary AAM, 
as well as the ways in which animal welfare and rights ideologies are 
                                                                    
14
 See DEBORAH CAO, ANIMAL LAW IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND 96−97 
(Rozelle, N.S.W ed., Thomson Reuters, 2010). 
15
 A Former Animal "Actor," Partially Deaf from Past Physical Abuse, NONHUMAN 
RIGHTS PROJECT, https://www.nonhumanrights.org/client-kiko/ 
[https://perma.cc/UF9S-6557]; The NhRP's First Client, NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, 
https://www.nonhumanrights.org/client-tommy/ [https://perma.cc/3Q8V-ZMGM ]; 
Two Former Research Subjects and the First Nonhuman Animals to Have a Habeas 
Corpus Hearing, NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, 
https://www.nonhumanrights.org/hercules-leo/ [https://perma.cc/RF7J-F7X3]. 
16
 Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc., ex rel. Tommy v. Lavery, 100 N.E.3d 846, 849 (N.Y. 
2018) (Fahey, J., concurring). 
17
 Narayan Dutt Bhatt v. Union of India and Others, Writ Petition (PIL) No. 43 of 2014, 
99A (India) [hereinafter Narayan Dutt Bhatt]. 
18
 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO [CONSTITUTION] art. 33 (Bol.); 
CONSTITUCIÓN DE ECUADOR DE 2008 [CONSTITUTION] arts. 71, 73 (Ecuador). 
19
 See, e.g., ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS (Cass R. 
Sunstein & Martha Nussbaum eds., 2006); GARY L. FRANCIONE & ROBERT GARNER, 
THE ANIMAL RIGHTS DEBATE: ABOLITION OR REGULATION? (2010). 
4
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represented in law.20 The article will then summarize the case for 
granting legal rights to animals, with reference to human rights 
literature.21 After this, attention will turn to the obstacles to granting rights 
to animals and the merits of developing an animal rights framework.22  
There are related issues that lie beyond the scope of this article. 
First, it is important to note that animal welfare and rights are not the 
only theories that provide a framework in which to understand our 
obligations to animals. Other perspectives include the feminist ethics of 
care framework.23 While the focus of this article is animal rights and 
welfare, the significance of other perspectives is acknowledged due to 
their legal applicability and the particular importance of these theories 
to the AAM.24 Further, entities other than animals are also excluded in 
the discussion of legal rights; for example, insects and the environment. 
The merits of different legal approaches to other excluded entities are 
also beyond the scope of this article. 
II. AN IDEOLOGICAL OVERVIEW OF THE CONTEMPORARY 
ANIMAL ADVOCACY MOVEMENT*** 
Ideology is an important factor in motivating actors in social 
movements generally,25 and in the AAM specifically. The need for many 
activists to provide “intellectual justifications for their feelings,” and 
perhaps a desire to be seen as being driven by a clear ideology rather 
than more emotive concerns, has led to animal advocates looking to 
philosophical writings on our relationship with animals to underpin their 
goals and actions.26 These writers include Tom Regan and Gary 
Francione, whose impact has been considerable, especially since the 
widespread adoption of the Internet.27 In addition, Peter Singer’s 
philosophy has been, and continues to be, particularly influential. Julian 
                                                                    
20
 See infra Part II. 
21
 See infra Part III. 
22
 See infra Part IV. 
23
 THE FEMINIST CARE TRADITION IN ANIMAL ETHICS  2–3 (Josephine Donovan & 
Carol Adams eds., 2007). 
24
 Garner, supra note 7, at 161; Attitudes to Animals, supra note 7, at 266; Willingness 
to Pay, supra note 7, at 346. 
***Editor’s Note: The following section is taken largely from Nick Pendergrast’s thesis. 
25
 Snow, supra note 6, at 383. 
26
 Julian Groves, Animal Rights and the Politics of Emotion: Folk Constructions of 
Emotions in the Animal Rights Movement, in PASSIONATE POLITICS: EMOTIONS AND 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 212, 221 (Jeff Goodwin et al. eds., 2001); Nicola Taylor, Luddites 
or Limits? The Attitude of Animal Rights Activists Towards Science, 3 J. FOR CRITICAL 
ANIMAL STUD. 46, 46 (2005). 
27
 See, e.g., Groves, supra note 26 at 221; Roger Yates, The Social Construction of 
Human Beings and Other Animals in Human-Nonhuman Relations. Welfarism and 
Rights: A Contemporary Sociological Analysis (2004) (unpublished thesis, Bangor 
University). 
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Groves labels the philosophers of the AAM as the “high priests” of the 
movement.28 Sociologist Bob Torres uses similar language to Groves in 
his depiction of the role of Singer as the unquestionable “god,” or at 
least “father” of the AAM.29  
A. Singer and Animal Welfare 
James Jasper and Dorothy Nelkin’s comment that “philosophers 
served as midwives of the animal rights movement in the late 1970s”30 
captures the significance attached to these writers. In this period, before 
Regan and Francione’s work began to influence the movement, Singer’s 
utilitarian philosophy was vital to the growth of the AAM, and a catalyst 
for an increase in concern amongst the general public about animal 
suffering. Singer’s text, Animal Liberation,31 was first published in 1975 
and led to not only an “organizational explosion” in groups advocating 
for animals but also assisted in the rise of the animal rights arm of the 
AAM.32 Mark Pearson, Executive Director of Animal Liberation New 
South Wales, emphasized the importance of Singer in “legitimising” 
concern for animals: 
Singer's work caused a big shock wave in faculties, 
industries, companies, animal industries and beyond 
because of his clear logic rather than the emotion and 
anthropomorphism usually associated with animal rights 
groups. Singer's work tore away the armoury that industries 
usually used to dismiss the claims of animal rights activists 
due to his rationality.33 
In his book, Singer drew on liberation sociology to understand that 
through “othering,” dominant groups assume their interests are more 
important than the interests of the oppressed group. This fundamental 
dynamic is useful in understanding racism and sexism, as well as 
                                                                    
28
 Groves, supra note 26, at 222. 
29
 BOB TORRES, MAKING A KILLING: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ANIMAL RIGHTS 4, 
111 (2007). 
30
 Siobhan O'Sullivan, Conflict and Coherence Within the Australian Animal Protection 
Movement 3 (2006) (Conference Paper, Australasian Political Studies Association 
Conference). 
31
 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation or Animal Rights?, in THE ANIMALS READER: THE 
ESSENTIAL CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY WRITINGS (Linda Kalof and Amy Fitzgerald 
eds., 2007). 
32
 DIANE L. BEERS, FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY: THE HISTORY AND LEGACY OF 
ANIMAL RIGHTS ACTIVISM IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (2006). 
33
 Interview with Mark Pearson, Executive Director, Animal Liberation New South 
Wales in The University of Melbourne (2011) [Reproduced in: A Sociological 
Examination of the Contemporary Animal Advocacy Movement] [hereinafter Interview 
with Mark Pearson]. 
6
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“speciesism”—that is, discrimination based on species.34 Animals are 
sentient (conscious and able to experience suffering and pleasure), 
meaning that they have interests (for example, an interest in avoiding 
suffering). Yet, due to speciesism, their interests are denied simply 
because of their species.35 Singer’s notion of animal liberation and 
discussion of speciesism were strong influences in the more widespread 
adoption of an animal rights ideology that challenged human-imposed 
hierarchies.  
These views challenged long-held values related to the animal 
welfare ideology, which was, and remains, focused on limiting the harm 
caused by the lower place in the hierarchy of living beings ascribed to 
animals. The focus is on working for better treatment of animals used 
for human ends.36 Animal welfarists oppose acts of cruelty towards 
animals, but not what they view as the humane use of animals, such as 
for food and clothing.37 While there had been individuals advocating for 
vegetarianism and against vivisection (experimentation on live animals) 
since the 1800s, a more radical movement with a significant animal 
rights component did not exist before the 1970s. Most animal advocacy 
organizations were traditional animal welfare organizations such as the 
Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA).38 
Welfarists not only accept human supremacy over all animals but 
also uphold hierarchies amongst animals: while all animals deserve 
ethical consideration, some are more deserving than others.39 For 
example, “the family companion animal, [welfarists] contend, 
unquestionably earns a higher place on the pyramid than a cow or pig.”40 
Elizabeth Cherry explains that in Western culture, cats and dogs are 
seen as “symbolically unfit for consumption,” in contrast to other 
animals socially constructed as “food animals.”41 Welfarists do not 
challenge these social constructions.  
In this respect, Singer’s rejection of speciesism and the serious 
consideration he gives to a wide range of species places his position 
closer to that of animal rights theorists such as Regan than the traditional 
                                                                    
34
 D. Wicks, Humans, Food, and Other Animals: The Vegetarian Option, in A 
SOCIOLOGY OF FOOD & NUTRITION 269 (John Germov & Lauren Williams eds., 2004); 
Interview with Peter Singer, at The Univ. of Melbourne (2012) [hereinafter Interview 
with Peter Singer]. 
35
 Wicks, supra note 34, at 269. 
36
 BEERS, supra note 32, at 3–4; Interview with Peter Singer, supra note 34. 
37
 BEERS, supra note 32, at 3. 
38
 Lyle Munro, The Animal Rights Movement in Theory and Practice: A Review of the 
Sociological Literature, 6 SOC. COMPASS 166, 170 (2012); Interview with Peter Singer, 
supra note 34. 
39
 BEERS, supra note 32, at 3; Munro, supra note 38, at 170. 
40
 BEERS, supra note 32, at 3. 
41
 Elizabeth Cherry, Shifting Symbolic Boundaries: Cultural Strategies of the Animal 
Rights Movement, 25 SOC. F. 450, 458 (2010). 
7
Kotzmann and Pendergrast: Animal Rights: Time to Start Unpacking What Rights and for Whom
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2019
164 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1 
animal welfare approach.42 Although Singer has played a vital role in the 
move towards animal rights in the broader AAM and, as noted above, 
has often been labelled as the “father of the animal rights movement,” 
he explicitly rejects a rights-based approach.43 Singer’s philosophy of 
“animal liberation” can be viewed as a “middle ground” approach, 
between animal welfare and animal rights.44  
This shows that these ideologies should be viewed as a continuum 
rather than a binary, with many views falling somewhere in between the 
two.45 Many animal advocacy organizations and individual animal 
advocates cannot be labelled as purely promoting animal welfare or 
animal rights, as they promote a mixture of both. For example, People 
for the Ethical Treatment of Animals believe in animal rights as their 
ideal “end goal,” reflected in their slogan “animals are not ours.” 
However, the organization engages in animal welfare campaigns 
alongside their animal rights campaigns in order to achieve short-term, 
pragmatic gains.46 This is why some theorists refer to various “clusters” 
in the movement,47 acknowledging a wide variety of “goals, tactics, and 
philosophical positions.”48 Siobhan O’Sullivan provides a critical 
analysis of these various clusters.49 
Singer explains that he is “far from those who take a rights-based 
approach philosophically.”50 He acknowledges that there is “more than 
a verbal difference” between the approaches; in fact, the philosophical 
differences are “fundamental.”51 These differences are also likely to have 
“practical implications.”52 Singer uses the term “‘animal rights’ [as a] 
shorthand reference [for the] way in which the needs and desires of 
animals [create] moral obligations on our part.”53 His association with 
                                                                    
42
 Interview with Peter Singer, supra note 34. 
43
 D. Bourke, The Use and Misuse of “Rights Talk” by the Animal Rights Movement, 
in ANIMAL LAW IN AUSTRALASIA: A NEW DIALOGUE 136 (Peter Sankoff & Steven 
White eds., 2009); Munro, supra note 38, at 171; Singer, supra note 31, at 15. 
44
 Munro, supra note 38, at 173. 
45
 Interview with Mark Pearson, supra note 33; O'Sullivan, supra note 30, at 3; Protecting 
Animals 33: Glenys Oogjes from Animals Australia, KNOWING ANIMALS (Apr. 15, 
2019), https://knowinganimals.libsyn.com/protecting-animals-33-glenys-oogjes-from-
animals-australia [https://perma.cc/U6Q7-HN25]. 
46
 Ingrid Newkirk, A Pragmatic Fight for Animal Rights, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 21, 2010), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cif-green/2010/jan/21/peta-animal-rights-
campaign [https://perma.cc/PP9K-FCG9]. 
47
 See, e.g., GARY FRANCIONE, RAIN WITHOUT THUNDER: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE 
ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 36−40 (1996); JAMES M. JASPER & DOROTHY NELKIN, 
THE ANIMAL RIGHTS CRUSADE: THE GROWTH OF A MORAL PROTEST (1992).  
48
 JASPER & NELKIN, supra note 47, at 8; O'Sullivan, supra note 30, at 3. 
49
 O'Sullivan, supra note 30, at 22−24. 
50
 Interview with Peter Singer, supra note 34. 
51
 Id. 
52
 Singer, supra note 31, at 3. 
53
 Id. 
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the term “animal rights” at the same time as philosophically rejecting a 
rights-based position illustrates the widespread confusion over the term 
“animal rights.”54  
Singer’s utilitarianist beliefs contribute to his rejection of a rights-
based position. It is the “rights” aspect of “animal rights” rather than the 
“animal” aspect to which Singer objects. He contends that to say human 
beings have rights just because of their species is an example of 
speciesism and that if humans do have rights, then so should animals. 
He rejects human rights and rights in general.55 Singer maintains that 
rights are not the only way to raise the status of animals.56 Instead, he 
proposes that we focus on animals’ interests and other considerations, 
such as animals’ preferences and their experiences of pleasure or pain. 
The focus on interests is consistent with a utilitarian approach, 
although other philosophical approaches also use the concept of 
interests. Utilitarianism focuses on the result of one’s actions.57 
Utilitarians use the universal “greatest happiness principle” to judge 
actions, with actions considered right if they produce happiness (defined 
as pleasure and the absence of pain) and wrong if they produce the 
opposite of happiness (defined as pain and taking away pleasure).58  
Singer contends that animal interests “should be given the same 
consideration as the like interests of any other being.”59 Singer’s critique 
of speciesism means that his approach to animals is different than the 
traditional animal welfare perspective,60 which contains “an in-built 
assumption that human interests are almost always more important than 
those of animals.”61 Giving animals equal consideration in these cases 
would not allow practices “based on treating animals as things to be used 
for our advantage, without any thought being given to the interests of the 
animals themselves.”62 The phrase “without any thought being given to 
the interests of the animals themselves” is critical. It clearly differentiates 
Singer from animal rights-based theorists. Singer’s utilitarian viewpoint63 
would not necessarily protect animals from uses such as 
experimentation but would require weighing the animals’ suffering 
against the benefits humans might realize from such experimentation.  
                                                                    
54
 FRANCIONE, supra note 47, at 2; Bourke, supra note 43, at 136, 143. 
55
 Singer, supra note 31, at 3. 
56
 Id. 
57
 Charles Taylor, The Diversity of Goods, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 129, 131 
(Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982). 
58
 John S. Mill, Utilitarianism, in PHILOSOPHY: THE BIG QUESTIONS 386 (Ruth Sample 
et al. eds., 2004). 
59
 Singer, supra note 31, at 3. 
60
 Interview with Peter Singer, supra note 34. 
61
 Bourke, supra note 43, at 133. 
62
 Singer, supra note 31, at 3. 
63
 Id. 
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The idea of animal welfare came about with the realization that 
animals’ physical and emotional well-being is important, not just their 
productivity for human ends.64 Cary Williams explains that “[b]oth 
animal rights and animal welfare advocates agree that animals should be 
protected, and that animals are sentient creatures.”65 These ideologies, 
however, vary greatly in the protection that should be granted to animals 
as a result of their sentience. According to the animal welfare approach, 
when humans use animals for their own ends, they have a duty to 
provide the following five freedoms for animals: “to be free from thirst 
or hunger; to have adequate shelter; to be kept free from pain, injury 
and disease; to be permitted to express normal behaviours (by providing 
sufficient space); and to be free from fear or distress.”66  
Despite the widespread acceptance of the idea of animal welfare in 
attitudes and legislation, these freedoms are not necessarily guaranteed 
for animals, who continue to be routinely crowded, confined, and 
harmed.67 The animal welfare approach, which opposes “unnecessary” 
suffering to the animals used by humans, assumes that animal pain and 
suffering can be acceptable, as long as humans believe the pain and 
suffering caused is “reasonable” or “necessary.” Even when the five 
freedoms are ensured, animal welfare ideology gives animal lives no 
inherent value and accepts their slaughter and use, while facilitating and 
regulating the process.68  
Singer’s utilitarian weighing of interests is primarily focused on 
pleasure and pain, much like the animal welfare perspective. Robert 
Nozick, however, criticizes utilitarianism as being too focused on 
experiences of pleasure and happiness while ignoring other 
considerations.69 Singer’s views are also questioned by Francione, who 
objects to Singer’s position on “replaceability.”70 Singer explains that 
“replaceability refers to the argument that one could defend raising 
animals in good conditions and kill them based on the fact that other 
animals could replace them.”71 Singer rejected the concept of 
replaceability in the first edition of Animal Liberation in 1975. 
However, in the second edition of this book, published in 1990, he 
explained that this rejection was not sound. Singer is now somewhat 
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undecided on the concept but is more inclined to accept it than he once 
was.72 
Singer’s position that animal suffering is important but continued 
life for animals is not is similar to traditional animal welfarists such as 
John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham (who were also utilitarians). 
Bentham’s famous quote about animals says, “[t]he question is not can 
they reason? Nor, can they talk? But can they suffer?”73 However, 
Bentham, like Mill and Singer, did not see killing an animal as imposing 
harm in and of itself.74 According to Francione, the utilitarian focus on 
pleasure and pain75 leads Singer to overlook animals’ interest in the 
continuation of their lives. To account for all animal interests, rights-
based theorists such as Francione and Regan argue that both 
utilitarianism and animal welfare are inadequate. 
B. Regan, Francione, and Animal Rights 
Regan applies fundamental moral rights to all sentient beings, 
regardless of intelligence or rationality.76 These sentient beings include 
vulnerable humans, such as infants and severely mentally disabled 
people, as well as all animals. According to rights-based theories, the 
rights of the individual trump the collective interest. In the moral game, 
the rights card is the “trump card.”77  
In the context of animal rights, Regan believes that animals should 
have certain moral rights, such as the right to bodily integrity and the 
right not to suffer.78 These rights place limits on what humans can do to 
animals, with individual rights trumping any benefits that come about to 
others as a result of violating their rights. For example, unlike Singer’s 
utilitarian perspective, Regan’s rights theory would protect animals from 
being forced organ donors and being subjects in medical experiments, 
regardless of the benefits to humans.  
Francione’s rights-based theories share many similarities with 
Regan’s but also some differences. Regan, as a philosopher, focused on 
moral rights but argued legal rights are an entirely separate matter.79 
Francione is a lawyer focused on legal rights for animals. Under the law, 
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persons are largely distinct from property,80 and animals are categorized 
as property.81 However, it is important to note that humans are afforded 
more limited property rights toward wild animals.82 Property comprises 
a “bundle of rights”83 that can be exercised by the property owner in 
relation to property, such as the rights to possess, to use, and so forth.84  
The problems created by the legal status of animals as the property 
of humans have been a “constant theme” of Francione’s work.85 
Francione argues that instrumentalism, which is the view of animals as 
means to humans’ ends,86 is only possible due to the property status of 
animals, as “to be property means precisely to be means to an end 
exclusively.”87 This instrumentalism is central to the exploitation of 
animals, as exploitation is defined as “making use of and benefiting from 
resources” and “making use of a situation to gain unfair advantage for 
oneself.”88 For Francione, it is the use of animals as property, for profit, 
and other selfish reasons, such as enjoyment, which is central to the 
problem of our current relationship with animals.89 These human 
interests are placed above the fundamental interests of their animal 
property, such as avoidance of suffering and continuation of life.90  
The egg and dairy industries are relevant illustrations of these 
processes in action. In these industries, males are generally killed within 
a few days of birth because they cannot produce the desired product.91 
Similarly, females are slaughtered once they are no longer producing 
enough eggs or dairy to be profitable.92 There is no desire to keep 
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animals alive, feed them food and water, provide them with space, and 
attend to their other needs when they are no longer profitable to their 
property owners. 
The property status of animals is the basis for Francione’s critique 
of animal welfare. Lisa Chalk, spokesperson for the RSPCA, explains 
that animal welfare is based on the idea of balancing the interests of the 
industries using animals and the interests of the animals themselves.93 
Francione argues that it is not possible to meaningfully balance the 
interests of animals and the industries that use them. This balance is 
meant to occur between property and the property owner, but the 
property owner always wins.94 As a result, despite animal welfare 
regulations designed to provide animals with some protection, “animals 
are largely unprotected from harm, so long as an overriding human 
interest can be identified.”95  
Francione believes that industries using animals only improve the 
treatment of animals when such gains are in their economic interests.96 
As animals are property, there will not be any gains in their treatment 
for their own sake, but only coincidentally. For example, there is a 
widely held belief amongst companies producing animal products, and 
even some animal advocates, that minimizing stress (especially prior to 
slaughter) and generally better treatment of animals leads to higher 
quality meat.97 Another example from the poultry industry is provided 
by some companies moving to controlled-atmosphere killing (gassing) 
of chickens. This practice is touted as a welfare gain in comparison with 
other methods of slaughter, such as slitting animals’ throats or 
maceration (blending them alive), although some experts debate this is 
a gain, as the RSPCA argues that maceration is more humane than 
gassing.98 Francione contends that this change to the slaughter method 
has been implemented because it is a more efficient way to kill chickens, 
rather than out of concern for the chickens themselves. Economically, 
there are benefits to the industry, including reducing worker injuries.99 
To sum up the point Francione is making, while animals are property 
under the law, improvements in their treatment will be negligible and 
are only initiated to make their exploitation and slaughter more efficient 
or profitable.  
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In terms of practical differences between animal rights and animal 
welfare, animal rightists are abolitionists seeking to abolish animal 
exploitation rather than merely regulating it.100 They consider that 
exploiting and killing animals for human ends is wrong in principle, 
rather than occasionally wrong in practice. Therefore, it is “not larger 
cages, but empty cages that animal rightists call for.”101 As Francione 
states, the problem with our current relationship with animals from an 
animal rights perspective is that we kill and use animals, in contrast to 
the animal welfare perspective, which is concerned with “how we treat 
them and how we kill them.”102 
While Francione and Regan’s theories, taken together, provide a 
useful summation of the animal rights perspective, there are differences 
in their approaches that go beyond Francione’s focus on legal rights and 
Regan’s focus on moral rights. One of these differences is more 
philosophical. When discussing the hypothetical situation of dogs and 
humans on a lifeboat that cannot support everyone, Regan contends that 
death is a much more significant harm for humans than animals.103 As a 
result, he argues that a dog should be sacrificed before humans, and 
even that one million dogs should be sacrificed to save one human, as 
the loss of human life is so much more significant.104 In contrast, 
Francione defends the idea of the “moral equality of human and 
nonhuman life.”105 This view goes against the consensus, even amongst 
“pro-animal” philosophers, “that human life is more valuable than 
animal life.”106 There are also other differences with more practical 
implications for activism. 
Regan and Francione’s views diverge markedly when it comes to 
the types of animal rights campaigns they advocate. Regan favors 
“winnable abolitionist campaigns” that focus on unpopular uses of 
animals, with the aim of abolishing these practices (rather than 
campaigning for better treatment generally).107 He cites examples such as 
animals performing in circuses, greyhound racing, seal slaughter, 
whaling, animals in product testing, and the fur industry.108 In contrast, 
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Francione sees single-issue campaigns focused on just one form of 
animal exploitation, rather than campaigning against all animal 
exploitation, as inconsistent with the aim of furthering progress towards 
the abolition of all animal exploitation.109 He maintains that single-issue 
campaigns “almost always reinforce the notion that certain forms of 
animal exploitation are better than others.”110 For example, he asserts 
that a campaign that opposes animals being killed for their fur, while not 
mentioning leather or wool, implies that fur is ethically a “worse” 
product.111  
Just as the property status of animals is central to Francione’s 
analysis of the current problems with our relationship with animals, the 
concept also underpins his solution. Francione believes that all sentient 
beings deserve not to be considered the property of someone else,112 so 
animals need just one right, which is “the right not to be treated as the 
property of humans.”113 According to Francione, if this right is extended 
to animals, they will become moral persons.114 This means that they will 
be considered beings with morally significant interests, rather than 
things.  
In order to achieve the legal personhood of animals, Francione 
believes the focus of the AAM should be on “vegan education” (the 
promotion of veganism) as the main tactic to incrementally move 
towards the goal of the abolition of animal exploitation.115 He explains 
that “ethical veganism is a profound moral and political commitment to 
[the] abolition [of animal exploitation] on the individual level and 
extends not only to matters of food but also to the wearing or using of 
animal products.”116 Ethical veganism, beyond just diet, is a rejection of 
the idea of animals as mere resources for human use and a recognition 
of their intrinsic moral value.117 Francione believes that this “rejection of 
the commodity status of nonhuman animals” through veganism leads 
towards the legal personhood of animals and the abolition of their 
exploitation.118 He sees this as being achieved through reducing the 
demand for animal products immediately and building a long-term 
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movement objecting to the use of animals as “things” or property, which 
can lead to meaningful prohibitions on animal use in the future.119  
C. Parallels to Human Rights in the Literature on Animal Rights 
Clear parallels exist between human rights and animal rights 
advocacy, which are illustrated in literature on animal rights. Regan and 
Francione often draw on examples from human rights to build their 
cases for animal rights rather than welfarist or utilitarian positions. One 
striking example from Regan was the Nazis’ use of human prisoners for 
hypothermia research. Without rights as a trump card, a utilitarian must 
weigh what was learned through research and how the results would 
protect others against the suffering of these prisoners. To the rights 
theorist, such benefits are very much beside the point and do not justify 
this research, as the individual’s right to bodily integrity has been 
violated.120 
Regan also draws on human rights examples to reject welfarist 
animal advocacy.121 He explains that death penalty abolitionists—who 
believe that capital punishment is inherently wrong in principle rather 
than just sometimes immoral in practice—call for the complete abolition 
of the practice, rather than attempting to reform it to make it more 
“humane.”122 He draws not only on these human rights debates about 
the death penalty, but also other debates such as human slavery or child 
labor to compare them to the animal rights and animal welfare debate. 
He sees differences but also some commonalities in the issues and the 
logic used in opposing these practices. He argues for the abolition of the 
exploitation of animals rather than attempting to make it more 
“humane.” Regan urges animal rights activists to take up this call just as 
human rights advocates call for the abolition of the death penalty. 
Similar arguments have also been made by others, such as Torres123 and 
Francione.124 
Francione draws on human rights to clarify his position on animal 
rights, explaining that his concept of animal rights does not mean giving 
animals the same rights as humans, since many human rights (such as 
the right to vote or free speech) have no application to animals.125 Indeed, 
as Regan notes, some of these rights also have no application to 
vulnerable humans, such as infants and severely mentally disabled 
people.126 
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With the property status of animals as a central theme of 
Francione’s work, he draws on institutionalized slavery in the United 
States to establish some lessons for animal advocates today.127 Francione 
explains that in the case of human slavery—where certain groups of 
people were classified as merely property rather than persons—there was 
some attempt to create a third legal category for slaves as “quasi-
persons,” or “things plus.”128 He argues that this did not work because 
this alternative category did not grant these individuals the right to have 
equal consideration given to their interests. Therefore, they were still at 
risk of being treated as non-person “things.” Francione explains that 
there are only two kinds of beings recognized in the moral universe—
persons and things—and that for the rights of animals to be taken 
seriously, they also need to be granted legal personhood.  
This overview of the contemporary AAM shows that there are 
significant ideological differences between animal welfare and animal 
rights positions. While advocates from each school seek to improve the 
status of animals, animal welfare advocates do not seek to end the use 
and exploitation of animals by humans, whereas animal rights advocates 
do. As was noted earlier, these positions cannot always be viewed as 
binary, as many advocates promote a mixture of rights and welfare, and 
some promote welfare in the short-term despite a long-term desire for 
animal rights. The next section of this article will consider the extent to 
which the law reflects animal welfare and animal rights ideologies. 
III. ANIMAL WELFARE AND ANIMAL RIGHTS IN THE LAW 
While the ideological overview provided above discusses animal 
welfare and animal rights positions both in moral and legal terms, this 
section of the article is focused solely on the manifestation of ideological 
positions in the law. For the remainder of the article, animal welfare laws 
refer to those laws that seek to improve the situation of animals, without 
attributing legal rights to them. For example, laws might require larger 
cages for battery hens or that sheep be protected from extreme 
temperatures when being exported by ship. Welfare laws like these do 
not give animals rights or impose duties on the animals in question.129 In 
contrast, animal rights laws refer to those laws that grant animals 
fundamental rights, which can be claimed through a guardianship 
arrangement, declared in and enforced through the law.130 In this respect, 
the following definition from Francione and Anna Charlton is useful:  
We use the term ‘animal rights’ in a different way, similar to 
the way that ‘human rights’ is used when the fundamental 
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interests of our own species are concerned. For example, if 
we say that a human has a right to her life, we mean that her 
fundamental interest in continuing to live will be protected 
even if using her as a non-consenting organ donor would 
result in saving the lives of 10 other humans. A right is a way 
of protecting an interest; it protects interests irrespective of 
consequences. The protection is not absolute; it may be 
forfeited under certain circumstances. But the protection 
cannot be abrogated for consequential reasons alone.131 
A. Animal Welfare Laws 
Currently, there is no international agreement relating to animal 
welfare.132 Nevertheless, past decades have seen multiple efforts aimed 
at achieving some international recognition and protection for animal 
welfare. Although it was never adopted, in 1988, the International 
Convention for the Protection of Animals was drafted seeking to 
establish standards for the treatment of animals.133 Subsequently, the 
World Society for the Protection of Animals commenced a process 
intended to create an international agreement relating to animal 
welfare.134 The Universal Declaration on Animal Welfare was drafted 
and has been subject to amendments in 2003 and 2005. Yet to date, it 
has not been adopted by the United Nations.135 There has been more 
success in the adoption of animal protection agreements in the regional 
sphere. For example, animal welfare is recognized in the Treaty of 
Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community. Article 13 of the Treaty 
provides that member states will “pay full regard to the welfare 
requirements of animals.”136 Article 13 also recognizes animal 
sentience.137 
Animal welfare ideology is, however, prominently reflected in 
national laws. Most states in the United States have enacted legislation 
seeking to recognize, protect, and improve the life circumstances of 
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some or all animals.138 In 1641, the Puritans of Massachusetts Bay 
Colony Code was passed, making the United States the first country in 
the world to enact laws to protect animals from cruelty.139 At the federal 
level in the United States today, the Animal Welfare Act of 1966 
provides minimum acceptable standards for the care and treatment of 
particular kinds of animals (excluding rats, mice, and livestock) and is 
implemented by the United States Department of Agriculture.140 
Further, all fifty states have some form of anti-cruelty legislation in place, 
although there is variability in the scope of protections afforded and 
numerous exclusions.141 Similarly, in Australia, all states and territories 
have passed legislation that seeks to protect animal welfare.142 In New 
Zealand, the Animal Welfare Act 1999 is directed towards safeguarding 
animal welfare.143  
Many countries have also included animal welfare statements in 
their constitutions. For example, under the Federal Constitution of the 
Swiss Confederation, Switzerland is required to legislate on animal 
protection.144 In India, the Constitution of India 1950 confers a duty on 
every citizen of India to “have compassion for living creatures.”145 
Similarly, in Brazil, the Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil 
requires the government to “protect the fauna and the flora, with 
prohibition . . . of all practices which represent a risk to their ecological 
function, cause the extinction of species or subject animals to cruelty.”146 
While there is a proliferation of animal welfare laws around the 
world, animals continue to suffer in countless and often unthinkable 
ways as a result of human action.147 There are a number of reasons for 
this. One reason that animals continue to suffer is the legislative 
exceptions, defenses, and qualifications that are frequently included in 
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animal welfare legislation.148 For example, in Australia, many Acts 
contain provisions that enable compliance with industry practice or a 
code of practice to operate as a defense to an animal cruelty charge.149 In 
other words, so long as there is compliance with common industry 
practice or a code of practice, prosecutions for animal cruelty will be 
unsuccessful. Further, animal cruelty legislation often excludes 
particular species. For example, in the United States, the protections 
provided by the Animal Welfare Act of 1966 do not extend to animals 
raised for food or the majority of animals used for research.150 These 
exceptions mostly limit cruelty prosecutions to isolated individual acts 
of harm to animals, rather than institutionalized suffering through 
animal industries. Even where animals are covered by legislative welfare 
protections, there can be a lack of enforcement of those protections.151 
In order for a law to be effective, it must be monitored and enforced. 
Therefore, violations of the law require consequences, but this is often 
not the case for animal welfare legislation.152  
A common feature of animal welfare legislation is that it 
discriminates between different species of animals. In particular, a 
distinction is often made between companion and non-companion 
animals and between wild and non-wild animals.153 Many jurisdictions 
also have special laws for assistance animals, animals used in 
entertainment, livestock, non-native species often referred to as “pests,” 
and animals used in research.154 The discrimination evident in many 
animal welfare laws is fundamentally based on the nature of the 
relationship between each species and humans.155 Thus, companion 
animals—those that are most valued by humans—enjoy higher levels of 
welfare protection than farm animals.156 The welfare protection that is 
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afforded to animals, therefore, is based on the perceived value of the 
animal to humans, and in this sense is speciesist.157 This aligns with 
animal welfare ideology in that animals are a means to an end, rather 
than having value in and of themselves. 
B. Animal Rights Laws 
Although the animal rights ideology is not commonly reflected in 
the law, in recent times, animal rights language has been invoked in the 
legal context. For example, article 33 of the Constitution of Bolivia 
confers the “right to a healthy, protected, and balanced environment” 
of “other living things.” Similarly, articles 71 and 73 of the Constitution 
of the Republic of Ecuador recognize the rights of Mother Earth and 
provide for the protection of species. In terms of legislation, the 
Norwegian Animal Welfare Act 2010 provides that “[a]nimals have an 
intrinsic value which is irrespective of the usable value they may have 
for man.”158 Some significant advances in the attribution of animal rights 
are detailed below. 
1. Recognition of Animal Rights in the United States: The 
Nonhuman Rights Project 
One of the most prominent examples of the emergence of animal 
rights in the law is the Nonhuman Rights Project (NhRP), founded by 
lawyer Steven Wise in the United States. The NhRP seeks to secure the 
legal recognition of rights for animals.159 In order to achieve this goal, the 
NhRP initiates litigation by filing writs of habeas corpus on behalf of 
animals held in captivity, advocating recognition of legal personhood, 
and in some cases, the right to bodily integrity.160 To date, the litigants 
include the great apes Tommy, Kiko, Hercules, and Leo; the elephants 
Beulah, Karen, Minnie, and Happy; as well as dolphins and whales.161 
The NhRP has also set up legal working groups in England, Spain, 
France, Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, Portugal, Argentina, Israel, 
Turkey, India, and Australia “to develop nonhuman rights campaigns 
suited to the respective legal systems” of those countries.162 The NhRP 
also seeks to work with local governments to develop legislation that 
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recognizes animal rights and raises awareness of the significance and 
legal basis for animal rights through education.163 
The NhRP has experienced significant successes through its 
efforts. In the case of Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Stanley,164 Justice 
Barbara Jaffe of the New York County Supreme Court ordered the 
Respondents to show cause as to why an order should not be made for 
the release and transfer to an animal sanctuary of the chimpanzees 
Hercules and Leo, who were being used as research subjects. This order 
made Hercules and Leo the first nonhumans in history to be granted a 
habeas corpus hearing to determine whether their imprisonment was 
lawful.165 Further, in her 2015 ruling, Justice Jaffe determined that 
persons (such as the NhRP) have standing to bring cases on behalf of 
animals without alleging any injury to human interests.166 This constituted 
a significant achievement because standing is a fundamental 
precondition necessary to receive any protection from the law.167 
Subsequently, in proceedings brought on behalf of the elephant named 
Happy, the Honorable Tracey A. Bannister of the Orleans County 
Supreme Court issued an order to show cause to determine the legality 
of Happy’s imprisonment at the Bronx Zoo.168 This made Happy the 
first elephant to be granted a habeas corpus hearing, as well as the 
second time in the United States that an animal had been granted such 
a hearing.  
In separate proceedings on behalf of the chimpanzee, Tommy, 
Judge Eugene M. Fahey of the New York Court of Appeals expressed 
views that were sympathetic to the attribution of rights to some animals. 
He stated that “[t]he issue whether a nonhuman animal has a 
fundamental right to liberty protected by the writ of habeas corpus is 
profound and far-reaching. It speaks to our relationship with all the life 
around us. Ultimately, we will not be able to ignore it.”169 While Judge 
Fahey’s comments are not legally binding, they do speak to a willingness 
on the part of at least some members of the legal community to engage 
in a discussion regarding the potential attribution of rights to animals.  
                                                                    
163
 Mission, NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, https://www.nonhumanrights.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/3PEU-AS9X]. 
164
 Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc., ex rel. Hercules v. Stanley, 49 Misc.3d 746, 748 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 2015). 
165
 Clients, Hercules and Leo (Chimpanzees), NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, 
https://www.nonhumanrights.org/hercules-leo/ [https://perma.cc/RF7J-F7X3]. 
166
 Stanley, 49 Misc.3d at 757. 
167
 Animals and Standing to Sue, INT’L SOC’Y FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS, 
https://isaronline.org/animals-and-standing-to-sue/ [https://perma.cc/Y3EH-5Y7W].  
168
 Client, Happy (Elephant), NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, 
https://www.nonhumanrights.org/client-happy/ [https://perma.cc/Y53M-5CH9]. 
169
 Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc., ex rel. Tommy v. Lavery, 100 N.E.3d 846, 849 (N.Y. 
2018) (Fahey, J., concurring).  
22
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 6
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol46/iss1/6
2019] ANIMAL RIGHTS  179 
 
 
2. Recognition of Animal Rights in Argentina 
The NhRP has also had a significant impact outside of the United 
States. In 2016 in Argentina, as a result of litigation modelled on that of 
the NhRP, Judge María Alejandra Mauricio ruled that a captive 
chimpanzee named Cecilia was a “non-human legal person” and had 
“inherent rights.”170 This made Cecilia the first animal in the world to 
gain legal personhood and have legally recognized rights.171 Judge 
Mendoza explained in her judgment that the ruling recognized and 
affirmed that primates are nonhuman legal persons that have 
fundamental rights “that should be studied and listed by state 
authorities, a task that exceeds the jurisdictional scope.”172 Further, she 
stated:  
This is not about granting [animals] the same rights humans 
have, it is about accepting and understanding once and for 
all that they are living sentient beings, with legal personhood 
and that among other rights; they are assisted by the 
fundamental right to be born, to live, grow and die in the 
proper environment for their species.173  
This was a very significant ruling that potentially sets a precedent 
for animal rights gains for other animals in Argentina and beyond. 
3. Recognition of Animal Rights in Switzerland 
Recently, Swiss courts have also begun to talk about animal rights. 
In a decision handed down on January 15, 2019, the Cantonal 
Constitutional Court ruled that an initiative that aims to grant primates 
constitutional rights to life and bodily and mental integrity was valid and 
is required to be submitted to people in Basel-Stadt for a vote.174 While 
the decision is subject to appeal, if the vote proceeds it will constitute 
the first democratic vote on whether animals should have rights.175 
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4. Recognition of Animal Rights in India 
Courts in India seem to be prepared to recognize rights for 
animals. In Animal Welfare Board of India v. Nagaraja,176 the supreme 
court considered whether events relating to “Jallikattu” and bullock-cart 
races conducted in the states of Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra were 
violations of provisions of The Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 
No. 59 of 1960 (PCA Act), read with provisions of the Constitution of 
India.177 The court stated that the imposition of obligations on persons 
having charge of animals in the PCA Act “confer[red] corresponding 
rights on animals.”178 It indicated that “[a]ll living creatures have inherent 
dignity and a right to live peacefully,” and have the right to have their 
well-being protected.179 It also noted that while there remains no 
international agreement relating to the protection of animals, there has 
been an observable trend towards greater recognition of nature—
including animal—rights.180 Consequently, “every species has an inherent 
right to live and shall be protected by law, subject to the exception 
provided out of necessity. Animal [sic] has also honour and dignity 
which cannot be arbitrarily deprived of and its rights and privacy have 
to be respected and protected from unlawful attacks.”181 
Additionally, the court in Nagaraja indicated that rights granted to 
animals under the PCA Act must be read in conjunction with articles 
51A(g)–(h) of the Constitution of India,182 which provides:  
51A.  Fundamental Duties. 
It shall be the duty of every citizen of India ─ 
 …. 
(g)  to protect and improve the natural environment 
including forests, lakes, rivers and wild life, and to have 
compassion for living creatures; 
(h)  to develop the scientific temper, humanism and 
the spirit of inquiry and reform….183  
Article 21 of the Constitution of India provides protection for 
“life,” and the court indicated that life includes animal life and “means 
something more than mere survival or existence or instrumental value 
for human-beings, but to lead a life with some intrinsic worth, honor, 
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and dignity.”184 Further, the rights protected under sections 3 and 11 of 
the PCA Act include the right to live in a healthy and clean atmosphere, 
to be protected from humans against the infliction of unnecessary pain 
or suffering, to food and shelter, and to dignity and fair treatment.185 
Moreover, the “five freedoms” found in chapter 7.1.2 of the guidelines 
of the World Organisation for Animal Health are to be read into 
sections 3 and 11 of the PCA Act: 
(i)   freedom from hunger, thirst and  malnutrition; 
(ii)  freedom from fear and distress; 
(iii)  freedom from physical and thermal discomfort; 
(iv)  freedom from pain, injury and disease; and 
(v)  freedom to express normal patterns of behaviour.186 
While these five freedoms were discussed above as welfare rather 
than rights protections, Indian law has gone well beyond traditional 
welfare protections and has started to transition toward rights for 
animals. The case of Narayan Dutt Bhatt concerned the treatment of 
horses that were being used to transport loads over the border of India 
and Nepal.187 Allegations were made that the conditions experienced by 
the horses were cruel in that the loads were very heavy, the horses lacked 
adequate shelter and, in some circumstances, were abandoned.188 The 
parties agreed to broaden the scope of the issues to be decided by the 
court, as it was considered in the public interest to do so.189 In particular, 
the court considered the question of whether legal personhood might 
be extended to animals, with legal personality generally being a 
prerequisite for the attribution of rights.190  
In the course of its judgment in Narayan Dutt Bhatt, the court 
emphasized that the concept of legal personhood is a legal fiction.191 In 
other words, it is up to humans to decide what does and does not count 
under the law, and legal personality is the way in which law makes 
something count. The court identified that there is precedent for a 
“gradual extension” of legal personality to all human beings,192 as various 
groups, including children and people with disabilities, did not enjoy 
such rights in the past.193 While the attribution of rights to animals may 
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seem fanciful, it is likely that the extension of rights to new groups always 
appears fanciful before it occurs.194 Further, legal personality has been 
granted to nonhuman entities in the past, including corporations195 and 
deities.196 Where legal persons, such as children, are not able to exercise 
their legal rights, the law operates to empower another person to 
exercise those rights on their behalf.197 Thus, having considered the 
relevant authorities, the court held that animals, birds, and fish are all 
legal persons with equal rights to human beings, and that all human 
beings have standing to seek the enforcement of animal rights: 
The entire animal kingdom including avian and aquatic are 
declared as legal entities having a distinct persona with 
corresponding rights, duties and liabilities of a living person. 
All the citizens throughout the State of Uttarakhand are 
hereby declared persons in loco parentis as the human face 
for the welfare/protection of animals.198 
The “corresponding rights” approach taken by the court includes 
three basic ideas. First, it involves attributing legal personality to animals. 
This means that, like human persons and corporations, animals are legal 
people capable of suing and being sued, owning property, and entering 
into contracts. Second, it requires legal recognition of animal rights, 
which will correspond to those capable of being held by humans. Given 
that fundamental human rights are recognized in law, animals should 
also be entitled to the enjoyment of fundamental rights. Finally, humans 
are empowered to act as legal representatives for the rights, duties, and 
liabilities of animals.  
IV. WHY THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS IS MORE PERSUASIVE 
THAN THE CASE FOR INCREASED WELFARE PROTECTIONS 
The debate regarding whether animals should be granted 
increased welfare protections or attributed rights has continued for 
several decades. This section of the article looks at the reasons why 
animal rights arguments are more compelling than those for increased 
animal welfare protections. In this respect, it considers the failure of 
animal welfare laws to adequately protect animals’ interests. It then 
proceeds to look at the importance of legal rights when compared with 
legislative welfare protections and the principles that might inform a 
rights-based approach to animals by reference to the experience of 
human rights.  
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A. Failure of Animal Welfare Laws 
Most countries have enacted laws that seek to protect the welfare 
of animals. For example, as identified earlier in this article, the United 
States was the first country to pass laws designed to protect animals from 
cruelty and negligence.199 In contemporary United States laws, the 
federal Animal Welfare Act provides for the care of some warm-
blooded animals.200 Further, the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act 
1958 aims to protect cattle, calves, horses, mules, sheep, and swine from 
being slaughtered in an inhumane manner.201 At the state level, all fifty 
states have enacted anti-cruelty legislation, although the scope and 
content of the legislation varies significantly between jurisdictions.202 
Despite the commonality of animal welfare laws, animals not only 
continue to be treated cruelly by humans, but the extent to which 
humans exploit them has grown.203 In the context of the agricultural use 
of animals, the emergence of factory farming methods of production has 
resulted in an increased use of cruel practices, including de-beaking, 
branding, cropping, and castration, as well as increased confinement 
and removal of natural light for animals.204 Similarly, in sports, animals, 
including horses and greyhounds, are increasingly subjected to 
overbreeding, poor conditions, and massacres.205 Even wildlife is not 
spared; each year, millions of animals are killed as “pests,” including 
rabbits, deer, and squirrels.206 
There are many reasons that animal welfare laws have failed to 
prevent cruelty to animals. One reason is that many practices that are 
cruel to animals actually remain within the law, as a result of common 
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exclusions from anti-cruelty legislation.207 For example, animals used for 
agriculture are often excluded from the scope of anti-cruelty 
legislation.208 Another issue is the enforcement of anti-cruelty legislation, 
which is frequently delegated to underfunded charitable organizations.209 
However, while it could be argued that improvements to animal welfare 
laws might resolve these problems, they would still fail to address the 
fundamental problem with animal welfare laws. At its heart, such laws 
always relegate consideration of animal interests below consideration of 
any rights or interests of humans.210 For example, while animal welfare 
legislation might prohibit causing animals “unnecessary” suffering, 
suffering may be considered “necessary” where the practices that cause 
it would reduce the costs involved with the production of animals for 
food.211 This suffering could also be considered necessary where such 
practices may contribute to scientific research outcomes,212 or even 
where they contribute to human entertainment.213  
B. Importance of Rights 
Academic literature related to the importance of rights is helpful in 
understanding how welfare standards have been insufficient to protect 
animals. Rights are of particular significance in the context of animal 
issues and provide an important tool for advocacy.214 One of the key 
reasons for granting rights is to protect marginalized and persecuted 
groups.215 In this respect, the international legal human rights regime 
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stemmed from a desire to prevent the kinds of atrocities perpetrated by 
the Nazi regime on Jewish, gypsy, disabled, and homosexual 
populations, among others.216 The attribution of rights to people 
belonging to marginalized and persecuted groups enables more effective 
advocacy on their behalf. Advocates are able to argue for improved 
conditions or better treatment on the basis that rights-holders are 
entitled to such things. Where legal processes are ineffective to enforce 
rights, the processes of “investigation, reporting and advocacy” enable 
advocates to pressure governments.217 Further, drawing on a rights 
discourse assists advocates to shape public morality and thus further 
contribute to political pressure on governments.218 In contrast, advocates 
arguing for improved welfare conditions are positioned to request such 
improvements, because there is no entitlement. Whether 
improvements are made, then, depends on the benevolence of the 
relevant decision-makers.219  
The attribution of legal rights also legitimizes the claims made by 
rights-holders and their advocates.220 Laws provide an agreed set of rules 
through which conduct is regulated. When the law grants rights, it 
validates claims based on those rights. While a similar argument may be 
presented in relation to welfare laws, rights provide a stronger claim. For 
example, legislation may provide that people are prohibited from killing 
an animal, or it may provide that animals have a right to life. The culling 
of rabbits as “pests” would, on its face, breach the prohibition on killing 
the rabbits but also deny the rabbits their right to life. It is a stronger 
position to claim a violation of the right than failure to adhere to the 
welfare standard because the focus is on the entitlement of the rabbits 
to their lives221 rather than on the conduct of people.  
Recognition of fundamental rights also provides a framework 
through which legislation can be analyzed and potentially amended to 
better respect rights. In the context of human rights, the United 
Kingdom, and both Victoria and the Australian Capital Territory in 
Australia, have enacted human rights legislation.222 These Acts require 
courts to interpret legislation, as far as it is possible to do so, in a way 
that is compatible with human rights.223 They also require written 
statements to be prepared in relation to proposed legislation which 
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outline the extent to which that legislation is compatible with human 
rights.224 Thus, they require parliaments to consciously consider whether 
proposed legislation might infringe human rights before it is passed. If 
similar legislation were introduced in relation to animal rights, there 
would likely be greater legislative recognition and protection of animal 
rights.  
Further, as alluded to above in the rabbit culling example, rights 
are important in that they shift the focus to the rights holder rather than 
the conduct of people involved in rights violations.225 This is important 
because it allows human rights holders to feel that their rights are 
recognized and taken seriously, and that their experience of having their 
rights violated is given primacy.226 In the context of the mass violation of 
human rights during the Holocaust, for example, use of a rights-based 
approach enables a focus on the experience of those who suffered at 
that time, rather than the experience of the perpetrators. In the context 
of animals, animal welfare laws tend to concentrate on the conduct of 
the person alleged to have infringed the law, in that “the value of animal 
life takes on a solely human orientated assessment.”227 The experience 
of the affected animals tends to be of little importance. While refocusing 
attention on the experience of the harmed animals may not be of 
relevance to the animals themselves, it does communicate to humans 
that animals hold intrinsic value.  
One further strength of rights is that they recognize the agency of 
those to whom they are attributed.228 In other words, rights-holders are 
recognized as having legitimate interests and are empowered to make 
decisions in relation to matters that concern them.229 This characteristic 
of agency may appear to be an obstacle to the attribution of rights to 
animals as it may be difficult to imagine animals having the autonomy 
to make their own decisions. However, in his book, Fear of the Animal 
Planet: The Hidden History of Animal Resistance, historian Jason 
Hribal thoroughly debunks the notion of animals lacking agency, 
documenting countless examples of animals resisting oppression.230 In 
addition, as in the case of infants and the severely disabled, animals to 
whom rights are attributed would be able to exercise agency through a 
legal guardian. In contrast, legislative welfare protections for animals do 
not permit the exercise of agency. Rather, these protections seek to 
regulate the relationships between people and animals, just as the law 
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regulates the relationship between people and other forms of property. 
As lawyer Steven White explains, the “current legal construction of 
domestic animals” within an animal welfare framework is “as objects of 
absolute ownership” rather than “guardianship.”231 
C. Principles that Inform Rights-Based Approaches 
An additional reason why the case for animal rights is more 
compelling than the case for increased animal welfare protection is the 
utility of the principles that generally inform rights-based approaches. 
Particular principles characterize a human rights-based approach. 
While there is no single human rights-based approach, there are 
principles that inform all such approaches which may be relevant to 
animal issues, and that are centered on the attribution of rights. These 
principles include recognition of dignity, accountability, and 
participation.232 If animal rights were recognized, these principles 
potentially hold great benefits for animals.  
One of the key principles underpinning a human rights-based 
approach is that of dignity. While the concept of dignity can be 
“indeterminate” and “complex,”233 it broadly refers to some inherent 
value possessed by human beings, which should be respected by 
others.234 The major human rights documents refer to dignity as the 
foundation of human rights laws. Thus, according to Freeman, “[t]o 
accord rights is to respect dignity.”235 When considering the potential 
attribution of rights to animals, it is worth considering the applicability 
of the concept of dignity; if dignity is the foundation of human rights, 
perhaps it might also function as the foundation of animal rights.236 
Analysis of the meaning of dignity indicates that it is not necessarily 
specific to humans and may extend to (or beyond) animals.237 Further, 
using the term “dignity” in relation to animals would send a message that 
animals do have intrinsic value and should not continue to be viewed as 
tools for human use.238     
Another fundamental principle of a human rights-based approach 
is accountability. While in the context of humans, a welfare approach 
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involves the provision of discretionary benefits as a result of government 
policy, a human rights-based approach places obligations on the 
government to ensure people’s rights are enjoyed.239 Thus, people are 
entitled to the enjoyment of their rights and are able, through a variety 
of enforcement mechanisms, to hold governments accountable when 
they fail to fulfill these obligations. One of the key benefits of a rights-
based approach to the legal regulation of animals, therefore, is the 
change in perception that should follow. Rather than positioning 
animals to rely on the goodwill and intentions of the government, 
animals (and their human guardians) would be able to claim rights as 
their entitlement. This would strengthen advocacy efforts in the short-
term and should also lead to positive cultural change in the longer term.  
Participation is another characteristic of a human rights-based 
approach.240 Where people enjoy rights, they are entitled to participate 
in decisions that may impact them. Students, for example, should be 
involved in decisions concerning pedagogy, as this will impact their 
enjoyment of the right to education.241 Participation is important because 
what particular rights-holders need should not be assumed.242 As a result 
of the rights-holders’ participation, decisions should better meet the 
needs of the rights-holder. If animals were granted rights, then they 
should also be able to participate in decisions that affect them. While 
direct participation would not be possible, legal guardians could 
participate on behalf of animals.243  
D. Obstacles to the Attribution of Rights to Animals 
Despite the failure of welfare protections to safeguard the interests 
of animals, and the merits of a rights-based approach to animal issues, 
there are still people that consider the concept of animal rights absurd.244 
This section of the article examines the obstacles to the recognition of 
animal rights. It begins by looking at the allegation that granting animals 
rights would be absurd, as well as the possibility that rights language itself 
is clouding the potential benefits of recognizing animal rights. It also 
looks at some obstacles that were overcome in the context of human 
rights and how those obstacles may be overcome in granting animal 
rights, including that animals are currently treated as property in the law, 
that animals lack the capacity to exercise rights, and that recognition of 
animal rights may conflict with human rights.  
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1. The “Absurdness” of Animal Rights 
The concept of animal rights is frequently described as absurd. In 
general, animal rights critics contend that human beings are significantly 
different from all other animals and that they should, therefore, be 
uniquely entitled to legal rights. In particular, human attributes, 
including the ability to make rational choices and exercise autonomy, 
have been identified as being critical to enable a bearer of legal rights to 
exercise those rights. Given that animals do not have these attributes, 
some argue that they cannot be granted legal rights. On occasion, critics 
also point to the absurdity of granting particular human rights to animals, 
including the right to vote245 or the right to work.  
Many arguments have been advanced to counter these claims. In 
particular, following the argument from marginal cases, denying rights 
to animals on the basis that they lack attributes such as rationality or 
autonomy means that rights should also be denied to human beings who 
lack such attributes. In other words, the reasoning behind denying 
animals rights should also compel us to deny rights to severely mentally 
handicapped human beings and very young children. Such an outcome 
is unlikely to be accepted by the general public.  
2. Rights Language Itself as a Barrier 
Rights language itself may act as a barrier to the acceptance of the 
concept of animal rights. Reference to rights in contemporary society 
has become a common means to advance human claims to protection. 
In this respect, Sumner asserts that “there is virtually no area of public 
controversy in which rights are not to be found on at least one side of 
the question—and generally on both.”246 Yet the general understanding 
of human rights—and thus rights more broadly—has developed in the 
context of human conflicts. For example, international laws that 
enshrine human rights were enacted against the background of atrocities 
committed against human beings during World War II.247 The concept 
of rights has become intimately connected with human beings,248 and the 
idea of extending rights to nonhuman animals may seem nonsensical to 
some people.  
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To determine whether this is a legitimate criticism, reference needs 
to be made to the definition of a right. While this may seem 
straightforward, following Hohfeld’s work regarding rights,249 numerous 
definitions of right have been put forward. For example, according to 
Kamenka, “[r]ights are claims that have achieved a special kind of 
endorsement or success”250 while Campbell asserts that “[t]he standard 
view is that rights are moral entitlements.”251 Similarly, McCloskey 
asserts that rights are simply entitlements
252
 and according to Feinberg, 
rights are “valid claim[s].”253 Some definitions of rights do include an 
aspect of humanness. For example, according to Kleinig, rights are 
“those minimum conditions under which human beings can flourish 
and . . . which ought to be secured for them.”254 Yet, such definitions 
provide no reason for the exclusion of other beings from rights.  
When considering the various definitions, two basic aspects of 
rights commonly appear. First, rights are claims that can be made. In 
other words, in asserting a right, the rights-holder is making some form 
of a request. Second, there is validity to the claim. This validity can be 
expressed using varying language such as “entitlement” or 
“endorsement.” Considering rights as legitimate claims, it is clear that 
there is nothing in the definition of a right that prevents rights from being 
attributed to animals.  
3. Legal Status of Animals as Property 
As previously identified, animals are generally treated as property 
under the law,255 and property does not have rights.256 While this is the 
case, it is not a true obstacle to the attribution of rights to animals as the 
“body of entities that have been granted legal personhood has 
continually expanded.”257 For example, laws have, in the past, generally 
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treated children primarily as property.258 Indeed, the property status of 
children continued up until the second half of the 20th century. 
Attributing rights to children has been a very recent development.259 
Similarly, institutionalized slavery constituted “a system of property 
ownership.”260 The law in these contexts operated as part of the problem 
by marginalizing vulnerable groups and legitimizing the unethical 
treatment of them.261 Changing the law to recognize especially vulnerable 
groups—such as children and animals—as legal persons and rights-
holders would reduce the likelihood that they will be exploited or 
mistreated because they, or at least their guardians, will be empowered 
to use the law in cases where their rights are violated.  
4. Capacity of Animals to Exercise Rights 
Similarly, some claim that animals cannot be attributed rights 
because they do not have the capacity to exercise rights or to recognize 
and respect others’ rights.262 In particular, rights that are strongly 
premised on human capacities, such as the right to vote, are pointed to 
as highlighting the absurdity of recognizing animal rights.263 Further, 
rights are said to place obligations or duties on others,264 and the inability 
of animals to respect rights and fulfill rights-related duties is also used to 
stand against the recognition of animal rights.265  
The capacity argument has also been made in the case against 
recognition of children’s rights.266 Freeman states that “those who argue 
against children’s rights . . . argue that children are just not qualified to 
                                                                    
258
 HANITA KOSHER ET AL., CHILDREN’S RIGHTS AND SOCIAL WORK 9 (2016); S. N. 
Hart, From Property to Person Status: Historical Perspective on Children’s Rights, 46 
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 53, 53 (1991). 
259
 KOSHER ET AL., supra note 258, at 12−14; Hart, supra note 258, at 53. 
260
 Gregson v. Gilbert (1783) 99 Eng. Rep. 629, 630 (KB); Pearne v. Lisle (1749) 27 Eng. 
Rep. 47, 48 (KB); Paul Finkelman, Slavery in the United States: Persons or Property?, 
in THE LEGAL UNDERSTANDING OF SLAVERY: FROM THE HISTORICAL TO THE 
CONTEMPORARY 105, 107 (Jean Allain ed., 2012); Seymour, supra note 80, at 185.  
261
 Seymour, supra note 80, at 185. 
262
 Roger Scruton, Animal Rights, CITY J. https://www.city-journal.org/html/animal-
rights-11955.html [https://perma.cc/K2M4-DLNC]; Geordie Duckler, Two Major 
Flaws of the Animal Rights Movement, 14 ANIMAL L. 179, 187, 192−93 (2008). 
263
 Jenkins, supra note 245. 
264
 Clare McCausland, The Five Freedoms of Animal Welfare Are Rights, 27 J.  AGRIC. 
& ENVTL. ETHICS 649, 654 (2014). 
265
 See Wesley Smith, Animal Welfare Versus Animal Rights: A Reply to Matthew 
Scully, NAT’L REV., (Mar. 4, 2010), 
https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2010/03/22/animal-welfare-versus-animal-
rights/ [https://perma.cc/N3GG-FLXJ]; Duckler, supra note 262, at 192−93. 
266
 MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 10, 13−14 
(2005); Onora O’Neill, Children’s Rights and Children’s Lives, 98 ETHICS 445, 463 
(1988); Laura Purdy, Why Children Shouldn’t Have Equal Rights, 2 INT’L J.  CHILD. 
RTS. 223, 227 (1994). 
35
Kotzmann and Pendergrast: Animal Rights: Time to Start Unpacking What Rights and for Whom
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2019
192 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1 
have rights; they lack the capacity to do so.”267 The problem with the 
capacity argument, however, is that holding rights “becomes exclusive 
and exclusionary.”268 In other words, rights are only held by those 
deemed to have capacity. Conversely, those who are deemed to lack 
capacity, such as children or the mentally disabled, cannot hold rights 
and their rights claims “need not be recognised.”269 Clearly, this result 
runs counter to the purpose of human rights in the first place—to ensure 
the respect and recognition of people’s equality and dignity.270 Further, 
the capacity objection also suffers in that it “underestimates the 
competencies that children, even young children, have.”271  
Where the capacity objection is raised against the recognition of 
animal rights, the same answers outlined above may be made. Animals 
should be recognized as having moral value and dignity.272 Denying them 
rights also operates to deny them these, as to grant rights is to recognize 
dignity.273 Further, animals do not lack capacity; they possess many 
capacities, some of which are similar to those that humans possess, and 
others that are not possessed by humans.274 Humans should be careful 
not to underestimate the competencies of animals. Where animals lack 
capacity to claim or exercise rights, they should be entitled, as children 
are, to have legal guardians act on their behalf.275 In the case of non-
domesticated or “wild” animals, an animal advocacy body could be 
appointed as their guardian, similar to the case of the Whanganui River 
in Aotearoa (New Zealand), which has been recognized as a living entity, 
with its interests represented by the office of Te Pou Tupua.276 Further, 
like children, animals should be “deemed incapable of committing an 
offence.”277 Humans should not be relieved of their obligations to 
recognize and respect the rights of others merely because animals are 
incapable of exercising such restraint due to their nature. As Aysel 
Dogan points out, humans have the ability to make moral choices and 
thus “[w]e are morally obliged to observe the good of others whenever 
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we are in a position to do so,” including in relation to the benefit of 
animals.278 
5. Conflict with People’s Interests 
Another argument that is made against the attribution of animal 
rights is that they might conflict with human rights and interests.279 It is 
argued that a legal system that recognizes human rights is not able to 
accommodate a concept of rights for animals.280 Further, others make 
the case that to attempt to recognize both human rights and animal rights 
would result in consequences that are either absurd or fearsome.281  
These same arguments have been made in relation to children’s 
rights.282 The truth is that withholding rights from animals works in favor 
of humans (as withholding rights from children worked in favor of 
adults).283 However, like children,284 animals are particularly vulnerable 
relative to adult humans. Freeman says of children’s rights:  
There are good reasons why the interests of children should 
rule . . . Children are especially vulnerable. They have fewer 
resources – material, psychological, relational – upon which 
to call in situations of adversity. They are usually blameless, 
and certainly did not ask to come into the world. For too long 
they have been regarded as objects of concern (sometimes, 
worse, as objects), rather than as persons, and even to-day 
they remain voiceless, even invisible, and it matters not that 
the dispute is about them.285 
These same points may be made in relation to animals, perhaps 
even to a greater degree. Animals have no entitlement to resources. 
They are generally blameless and did not ask to come into the world, 
let alone be exploited by humans. They have generally been regarded 
by humans as “things” to be exploited for human needs and desires, and 
only recently have become objects of concern, despite evidence of their 
sentience and capacity for suffering. They are almost entirely voiceless, 
and disputes about them tend to center on human interests, and 
particularly economic concerns. Thus, animals need laws that will 
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operate to protect them from human exploitation and cruelty. On 
occasion, these protections might undermine human interests, just as 
children’s rights sometimes undermine the interests of adults.  
E. The Benefits of Developing a Comprehensive and Coherent 
Framework for Animal Rights and Some Suggestions in this 
Respect 
This section of the article explores the merits of developing a 
comprehensive framework for the attribution of rights to animals. 
While existing literature has begun to explore the question of what rights 
might be granted to animals and the practicalities of how such rights 
might operate, significant work remains to be done. Undertaking this 
work would have immense value for a number of reasons. In particular, 
shifting the scholarly discussion from the debate over rights versus 
welfare to “fleshing out of the specific rights to which justice entitles 
them”286 is likely to overcome some of the obstacles to animal rights 
identified above. It would also complement efforts by the Nonhuman 
Rights Project and similar bodies to secure legal rights for animals 
through the courts. In terms of the initial steps toward the development 
of an animal rights framework, some argue that in order to be 
persuasive, a framework should be based on animal sentience, and 
“must necessarily rely upon the pre-existing basic rights of human 
animals.”287 
1. Animal Rights in the Literature 
To date, scholarly discussion relating to the potential attribution of 
rights to animals has primarily focused on whether animals require legal 
rights or increased welfare protections. As Alex Bruce asserts, “[t]here 
are essentially two schools of thought concerning the welfare of animals 
in liberal democratic societies… ‘animal welfarism’ and ‘animal 
rights.’”288 For example, in “The Animal Rights Debate: Abolition or 
Regulation?” Gary Francione and Robert Garner debate whether 
animal use must be abolished through rights, or whether animal interests 
can be protected within contemporary legal frameworks.289 Similar 
commentary has included a perspective from renowned ethicist B. E. 
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Rollin on animal rights versus welfare,290 and debates between Matthew 
Scully and Wesley J. Smith on the topic.291 This focus on rights versus 
welfare has been a reasonable approach to take, given that the welfare 
paradigm remains the dominant approach to animal protection issues.  
While the dominant focus in the literature has been on the welfare 
versus rights debate, some attempts have been made to give substance 
to a framework for animal rights that could underpin legal reform. Tom 
Regan’s philosophical theory is one of the most prominent cases for 
animal rights, yet he has argued that legal rights are a separate matter.292 
Gary Francione has argued that animals need only one right, the right 
to not be the property of humans.293 Yet it would seem that in the case 
of human beings, the right to not be the property of humans has been 
insufficient, warranting the attribution of human rights. Accordingly, it 
is likely that recognizing an animal’s right to not be the property of 
humans would be insufficient on its own to protect animal interests.  
Some theorists go further in identifying specific rights to be 
attributed to animals. For example, James Rachels294 has argued that 
research animals should be recognized as entitled to both the right to 
not be tortured295  and the right to liberty.296 Martha Nussbaum asserts 
that “all sentient beings, at least, have entitlements to the basic 
conditions of a life according to the dignity of their species.”297 Her 
capabilities approach provides some substance to the legal rights that 
might be accorded to animals, including the right to life, to bodily health, 
to bodily integrity, and so forth.298 Nevertheless, there remains a need to 
develop and give substance to the specific rights that should be accorded 
to animals, and the consequences of such recognition.  
2. The Pivotal Role of the Law for Animals 
As Nussbaum identifies, “[n]o major crimes against sentient beings 
have been curbed by ethics alone, without the coercive force of law.”299 
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Thus, the law should be a key consideration for those seeking to ensure 
the protection of animals from human cruelty and exploitation. In this 
respect, law is important because it is “an important symbol of legitimacy 
. . . an accomplished fact, which it is difficult to resist. And it change[s] 
attitudes as well as behaviour.”300 Further, the law is critical because it is 
what causes animals to be vulnerable to human cruelty in the first place. 
Therefore, it is the only thing capable of protecting animals from 
humans. This point is eloquently expressed by Korsgaard: 
[I]t is not just because we are individually smarter than the 
other animals that human beings are able to do as we will with 
them. It is because human beings are so cooperative and 
therefore so organized. And the way that we organize 
ourselves is by making laws, which set the terms of our 
interactions and so unite us into an effective whole. If the law 
says it is permissible for a person to inflict torments on an 
animal in order to test a product, for instance, then there is 
nothing anyone can do to protect that animal. So it is one of 
those cases ─ and there are certainly others ─ in which the 
only thing that can afford protection against the power of the 
law is the law itself.301 
Thus, the discussion in relation to animal rights needs to focus on 
what legal changes are required to achieve justice for animals. In this 
respect, it is important for the law to recognize animals as legal persons 
because without such recognition, animals are mere property and not 
able to hold rights.302 Further, in developing frameworks for animal 
rights, the focus needs to be on the required legal reforms. Philosophical 
theories will be helpful in this respect, but the means by which such 
theories might translate into enforceable laws needs attention.  
3. Demystification of the Animal Rights Concept 
For some people, the concept of animal rights may be terrifying. 
They may wonder, for example, whether their pets would be able to sue 
them and whether animals would be able to roam the streets. One of 
the benefits of developing a comprehensive and coherent framework 
for the attribution of legal rights to animals is to remove some of this 
fear. By setting out the theoretical basis for recognizing rights, and 
identifying which specific rights should be attributed, and to which 
animals, there is less opportunity for “what if” fears. Thus, giving 
substance to the concept of legal rights for animals can help to overcome 
some of the obstacles to the recognition of animal rights identified 
above.  
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Moreover, clearly identifying the common-sense legal rights that 
should be attributed to animals is likely to be more persuasive than a 
“rights are better than welfare protections” style claim. For example, it 
may be proposed that all animals should be granted a right not to be 
subject to torture. If so, it would be necessary to flesh out the content of 
the legal right as applied to animals, identify the particular consequences 
of its attribution, and discuss circumstances (if any) in which such a legal 
right may be limited. While some people may object to some aspects of 
the proposed animal right not to be subject to torture, it is likely that 
most people would agree that animals should, in general, not be 
tortured. Thus, clearly identifying the ways in which animals should not 
be treated and the ways in which animals should be treated is likely to 
persuade more people to support animal rights.  
Further, developing a comprehensive and coherent account of 
which rights should be accorded to animals before changes to the law 
are made will help ensure the adequacy of animal rights laws. In 
particular, some attention should be given to the theoretical basis that 
should underlie animal rights laws, as well as the justification for their 
enactment. Developing this comprehensive account of animal rights is 
also likely to ensure consistency in the attribution of rights to animals 
and anticipate any potential issues that might emerge if animal rights 
laws are enacted. A detailed account of animal rights will assist countries 
looking to enact such laws. 
4. Sentience as a Basis 
The jury is no longer deliberating on whether animals are sentient; 
it is widely accepted and scientifically established that they are.303 This 
means that animals have the ability to feel or perceive things.304 Thus, 
animals are able to feel pleasure and pain and likely have “some of the 
[same] desires [as humans] . . . for food and water, shelter and 
companionship, freedom of movement, and avoidance of pain.”305 
Animal sentience has formed the basis of many arguments for 
concern for animals. As noted above, one of the seminal thinkers raising 
the status of animals, Jeremy Bentham, famously stated in relation to 
the question of who should be given moral consideration, that “[t]he 
question is not, Can they reason? nor Can they talk? but Can they 
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suffer?”306 Similarly, Gary Francione’s argument for the recognition of 
animal rights is based “only on animal sentience and no other cognitive 
characteristic.”307 He argues that all sentient beings should have the right 
to not be treated as the property of others.308 
Arguably, the sentience of human beings provides much of the 
justification for the creation of international human rights laws. While 
the concept of rights has a long history, it was only following World War 
II that the documents comprising the International Bill of Rights were 
signed and ratified.309 Thus, the creation of modern international human 
rights law constitutes a direct response to the atrocities committed in 
World War II.310 In this respect, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights states that “disregard and contempt for human rights have 
resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of 
mankind.”311 The acts committed in World War II, primarily against 
Jews but also against gypsies and homosexuals amongst others, were 
barbarous because human beings are sentient. If humans did not have 
the capacity to feel pain or despair, such acts may have had little 
consequence.  
For these reasons, animal sentience should provide the basis and 
justification for the development of a comprehensive animal rights 
framework. This would align animal rights with human rights, and thus 
give clarity to an animal rights legal framework for the broader 
population.  
5. Drawing on the Pre-Existing Basic Rights of Humans 
As asserted by Steven Wise, the development of animal rights 
should draw on the pre-existing rights of humans.312 In this respect, 
human rights are granted in a number of ways. International human 
rights are set out in the International Bill of Human Rights and 
implemented in many domestic legal systems.313 Human rights are also 
present in many countries’ constitutions and legislation.314 While some 
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of these rights—such as the right to vote—would be inappropriate to 
apply in relation to animals, others—such as the right to not be subject 
to torture—may be relevant in the development of a framework for 
animal rights.  
A framework for animal rights should be developed using existing 
human rights laws for a number of reasons. First, human rights are 
commonly understood and accepted as a means to prevent the suffering 
of human beings. If it is desirable to prevent the suffering of other 
animals, it makes sense to apply a similar method to achieve that goal. 
Second, laws relating to human rights have developed and established 
frameworks for implementation and operation which may be beneficial 
when developing an animal rights legal framework. Third, drawing on 
established human rights laws acknowledges an aspect of equality 
between humans and other species. That animals feel pain in the same 
way that humans do is scientifically established, and acknowledging that 
in the law would provide a reminder of the reasons for attributing rights 
to animals.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Recent decades have seen an upsurge of interest in animal issues. 
This interest has been propelled by advances in human understanding 
of the extent to which animals are sentient and, in particular, the extent 
to which animals can feel pain and suffer. Additionally, the increased 
media attention of the mistreatment of animals, coupled with the 
developments in technology that enhance the media’s reach have 
increased the public’s interest in animal issues. In short, the public has 
become more aware of the plight of animals. At the same time, driven 
by the development and implementation of factory farming methods, 
human cruelty to animals is at an historic high.  
Given this context, there is a pressing need to discuss what further 
legal protections animals require. Two ideological frameworks 
dominate the discussion in this respect. The ideology of animal welfare 
accepts the use and slaughter of animals as human property, as long as 
certain protections are granted to the animals. Animal rights ideology, 
on the other hand, seeks to end the legal categorization of animals as 
property and grant them legal rights to protect their interests. 
To date, most laws directed towards the regulation of the 
relationship between humans and animals are representative of welfare 
ideology. In other words, they seek to place limits on the actions of 
humans so that the situation of animals is improved, but they do not 
grant rights to the animals themselves. These laws are not particularly 
effective. Animals continue to experience harm at the hands of humans 
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on a massive scale. Granting legal personhood and rights to animals may 
be more effective in improving the situation of animals. Some 
jurisdictions, particularly in recent times, have been willing to entertain 
a discussion of animal rights. While some of these laws are limited in 
scope, using a rights-based framework has far greater potential to lead 
to significant gains for animals than welfare laws. 
There are compelling reasons why recognizing animal rights is 
preferable to legislative welfare protections. Literature relating to human 
rights suggests that fundamental legal rights carry significant benefits that 
welfare laws do not provide. As Freeman states, “[t]he most 
fundamental of rights is the right to possess rights,” and so far, animals 
have been denied this right.315 Holders of rights are legal persons, 
enabling them to sue and be sued, hold property, and enter into 
contracts. Where welfare laws fail to provide sufficient protection for 
animals,316 these benefits could prove critical in enabling animals to seek 
protection from human harm through the law. They strengthen and 
legitimize advocacy efforts, shift the perspective to the rights subject, 
facilitate increased agency, and can be used as a framework to scrutinize 
legislation. Similarly, the principles of dignity, accountability, and 
participation inherent in all human rights-based approaches would be of 
great service in the animal context. As the Uttarakhand High Court 
observed in Narayan Dutt Bhatt:  
The law's attitude towards animals could be said to amount 
to a policy statement about human society's regard, or 
disregard, for animals. Thus were the law to bring animals in 
'out of the cold', where they languish as right-less beings, the 
objects of rights held by legal persons, and draw them under 
the umbrella of legal personality, it would ideally encourage 
the development of more respectful and less exploitative 
social attitudes towards animals.317 
This article has argued that it is time to shift the academic 
discussion from the philosophical question of whether rights or welfare 
protections are more desirable to a focus on setting out a legal 
framework for animal rights. This shift should operate to dispel some 
of the fear around attributing rights to animals and provide a reasoned 
basis for countries to move in this direction. In this respect, it is asserted 
that animal sentience should provide the basis for an animal rights 
framework, and that animal rights should build on the pre-existing rights 
of humans.  
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